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Abstract 
 
This study intends to provide a theoretical ground 
that conceptualizes the prospect of detecting insider 
threats based on leader-member exchange. This 
framework specifically corresponds to two 
propositions raised by Ho, Kaarst-Brown et al. [42]. 
Team members that are geographically co-located or 
dispersed are analogized as human sensors in social 
networks with the ability to collectively “react” to 
deception, even when the act of deception itself is not 
obvious to any one member. Close interactive 
relationships are the key to afford a network of human 
sensors an opportunity to formulate baseline 
knowledge of a deceptive insider. The research 
hypothesizes that groups unknowingly impacted by a 
deceptive leader are likely to use certain language-
action cues when interacting with each other after a 
leader violates group trust. 
 
Keywords: computer-mediated deception, human 
computer interaction, insider threat, language-action 
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1. Introduction 
 
Insider threat has been a complex and prolonged 
problem in the history of governments. Early 
espionage cases such as CIA agent Aldrich Ames and 
FBI agent Robert Hanssen provide examples of 
insiders that successfully deceived their colleagues. 
Both betrayed their organizations to sell national 
intelligence for personal profit, demonstrating the 
prolonged investigative challenges presented by a 
deceptive insider [1]. Studies have resulted in 
significant findings on illicit cyber activities within 
government sectors, as identified by the U.S. Secret 
Services and CERT/SEI [48], but insider threat 
incidents continue—and may be on the increase. After 
the 911 attacks, information-sharing across the 
governments was mandated, and easy access to 
information may have paved the way for Edward 
Snowden; a junior NSA contractor with elevated 
system administrator’s privileges who compromised 
and disclosed thousands of classified documents 
without authorization in 2013. Soon after, CIA hacking 
tools were leaked by intelligence agents and 
contractors [72, 73], setting intelligence operations 
back many years. While digital innovation works to 
improve the public sector’s ability to deliver value, and 
e-Government venues allow for novel systems 
capabilities and collaborative resources, the problem of 
insider threats increases by allowing the deceptive 
insider easy access to information (i.e., supported by 
the cloud computing services). The benefits of this 
innovation cannot be ignored, but the threat presented 
by rogue and deceptive insiders must also be 
addressed. Traditional case analysis approaches (e.g., 
[1, 48, 65]) do not allow for early threat identification 
of computer-mediated deception. New theoretical 
frameworks for understanding potential deceptive 
insider are urgently needed to balance the need for 
information sharing against the dangers of deceptive 
insiders accessing secrets and national intelligence 
within the government. 
The pervasive adoption of computer-mediated 
technologies has created new opportunities for 
communication and online self-expression, enabling 
collaboration that transcends our physical space. 
However, computer-mediated technologies also present 
challenges in the establishment and maintenance of 
trusting relationships among members in virtual teams. 
Trust, irrespective of communication mode (computer-
mediated or face-to-face), can be easily undermined by 
an act of deception [10, 11]. Ironically, when one 
communicating partner attempts to deceive another, 
s/he often will leverage the trust that has already been 
established with that partner to conceal the deception. 
When one group member attempts to deceive an entire 
group, particularly in a virtual team context, the 
deception unwittingly affects every interacting member 
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of the group, and can negatively impact the 
effectiveness of group communication as well as 
functional efficiency and operations. 
Identifying deception has been explored in a wide 
range of facets and contexts. For example, Ekman and 
Friesen [18], [19] suggested deception leakage through 
facial expression and body gesture. Deception occurs 
frequently from everyday white lies [13, 67], to serious 
lies [16]. Verbal [15, 75], nonverbal [7, 8, 14, 83-85], 
and text-based [81] cues in deceivers’ interpersonal 
communication have been effective clues for deception 
detection. Research on deception strategies [5, 6, 79], 
beneficiary [78], perceived credibility [24, 25], as well 
as cultural influences and media choice [23, 49] have 
collectively informed our understanding of “how” and 
“why” people deceive. Physiological and behavioral 
reactions, cognitive effort and stress can serve as 
indicators of deception [17, 59]. Moreover, automated 
credibility screening and assessment systems have 
been designed to evaluate the frequency of exposure to 
highly concealed information [20, 69, 70], and to 
conduct automated interviews that can detect deception 
[71] in face-to-face (FtF) settings. As rich as this 
deception research is, it has largely focused on the 
context of interpersonal communication. Several 
research efforts have been exploring the group’s ability 
to detect deception in virtual teams settings. Marett and 
George [54], for example, suggested that interaction, 
diverse knowledgebase and distinct perspectives in a 
group will positively influence the deception detection. 
Moreover, a deceiver will typically strategize to 
establish credibility by presenting truthful information 
at first, followed by false information. Marett and 
George [55] later explored the motivation, 
characteristics and intrinsic factors of deceivers in 
relations with the group members, and found support 
for the idea that deceivers devise strategies to confuse 
with false information, and that groups in this situation 
detect deception better when they are collocated. 
Giordano and George [27] further suggested the 
correlation of task complexity with a group’s ability to 
detect deception. That is, groups performing low-
complexity tasks can detect deception better than 
groups performing high-complexity tasks. Groups with 
baseline knowledge of each other can detect deception 
better than groups without baseline knowledge of each 
other. These studies suggest that the more familiar and 
experienced the deceiver is with the group, the less 
likely the deceiver will succeed in deception. Because 
the impact of leader deception [31] in group-level 
communication can be significant, and could result in 
loss of organizational commitment, reputation or 
revenue, the present study furthers this inquiry by 
bolstering literature in leader deception within a group 
context, with specific reference to the impact exhibited 
by group dynamics when a leader becomes deceptive. 
Unfortunately, effectively detecting insider threat 
presents great challenges. First, an insider’s deception 
generally occurs subtly, and there are rarely detectable 
early warning signs. Second, detection of insider’s 
deception requires acute observation and discernment. 
Inaccurate observations generate false positive alarms, 
and create a low trust atmosphere in the workplace. 
Third, although an insider refers to anyone in the 
organization, the present study specifically defines that 
an insider could be any individual with authorized 
access to information, that once betrayed, could inflict 
significant damage (e.g., reputational, or financial loss) 
against his or her own organization [42]. In this study, 
the term “leader” is metaphorically adopted to refer to 
those individuals who control critical information 
resources and whose access to certain essential 
information is granted. Thus, the leader’s deception 
becomes the focus of this theoretical inquiry. Based on 
the above challenges, this study adopts a new 
theoretical framework that aims to review and evaluate 
the communications between a deceptive insider and 
group dynamics, while proposing to explore group 
dynamics objectively, rather than through group 
members’ subjective cognitive perceptions as collected 
by survey instruments. More specifically, 
communication logs of virtual teams that include a 
deceptive leader are compared to those of control 
groups that do not. Moreover, the groups’ collective 
reactions before and after a leader becomes deceptive 
are also hypothesized as being capable of indicating a 
possible insider threat occurrence. 
This paper discusses an inquiry into the influences 
of deceptive leaders’ behaviors on the collective 
perspectives of virtual teams, and intends to address 
the research question: How is communication in a 
virtual team collectively impacted to reflect the 
presence of a deceptive leader? To answer this 
question, leader-member exchange (LMX) and 
deception literature are reviewed and discussed. Ho, 
Kaarst-Brown et al. [42] boldly postulated that 
“humans as smart sensors can understand and interpret 
subtle communication signals associated with reduced 
trustworthiness” (p. 276). Based on this proposition, 
the present study framework further develops the 
rationale for observing patterns of language-action 
cues in a virtual group’s interactive communication 
behavior that can collectively “react” and change after 
a leader has taken covert actions to deceive. 
 
2. Group Trust in Leader Member 
Exchange 
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Trust influences and impacts interpersonal 
relationships, as well as the relationships within, 
between, and among groups [45]. In a group context, 
trust is essentially necessitated by the interdependence 
of the group members. Each member of the group is 
expected to fulfill a designated role and perform 
certain responsibilities that contribute to the group’s 
collective goal(s). As such, each member’s ability to 
perform their own tasks to some extent depends upon 
others also performing their respective designated 
responsibilities. Group trust depends on the interaction 
and relationships between leaders and their group 
members. Team leaders play an essential role in 
establishing and maintaining trust among members of a 
team, and members develop exchange relationships 
with their leaders [76]. Group trust can be influenced 
by a leader’s behavior and leadership style. Dansereau, 
Graen et al. [12], Liden and Graen [50] and many 
colleagues proposed the dyadic exchange between 
leader and subordinates concerning organizational 
behavior. Liden, Wayne et al. [51] suggested that 
leaders tend to develop different leadership styles, 
relationships or exchange with different subordinates. 
Moreover, Bauer, Green et al. [2] suggested that 
“leader-member exchange is intertwined with the 
concept of mutual trust” (p. 1541). The importance of 
the interaction between the leader and members was 
emphasized, especially when building group trust [26, 
52]. Different leadership styles engender different 
group communication patterns and performance 
outcomes [53]. On the other hand, members of a group 
can also develop different types of social exchange 
relationships both with other group members as well as 
with their immediate supervisors. As leaders represent 
organizational support, LMX social exchange can 
influence and mediate members’ perception of the 
overall organizational support [76]. The differences in 
leader-member exchanges within a group will impact 
the group members’ work attitudes, as well as 
coworkers’ relationships with each other. Erdogan and 
Bauer [22] noted that while low-quality leader/ 
member exchanges typically put less favored 
employees/ members at a disadvantage in terms of 
resource distribution and promotion; high-quality 
leader/member exchanges often result in faster 
advancement and productivity for a favored employee/ 
member. LMX differentiation is the extent to which a 
leader’s behavior affects (encourages or undermines) 
group trust and performance outcomes [35, 53]. That 
is, perceived injustices by a group leader against 
certain group members can negatively affect the 
attitudes, interactions, sense of loyalty and 
commitment of all group members [21, 22]. Moreover, 
group members may withdraw (i.e., reduce 
interactivity/ participation) when they perceive an 
imbalance in fairness or justice. 
One’s trust towards an individual can be impacted 
(i.e., reduced or lost) as a result of the violation of 
competence in the performance of obligations, or the 
violation of integrity [42]. Competence-based trust 
violations occur when group members feel betrayed 
because a member does not fulfill obligations or 
expectations. This breach of trust occurs as a result of 
“incongruence” [57] arising from a violation against 
the reciprocal exchanged agreements (often referred to 
as a “psychological contract”) by and among group 
members [63, 66]. Integrity-based trust violations, on 
the other hand, occur when a member behaves against 
the interests of the group in an illegal or unethical 
manner [36, 40, 42]. This violation of integrity-based 
trust, often triggered by a leader’s ethical dilemma, 
constitutes an act of deception [40]. When this leader 
violates group trust, not only does the violation 
significantly impact the functions and effectiveness of 
a group, but his/her intimate knowledge of the group’s 
activities and privileged access to relevant information 
may also jeopardize intellectual property and 
information assets. Jones and Marsh [46] stated that in 
some cases, the cause(s) of a loss of group trust may be 
superficial and relatively minor (e.g., personality 
clashes between individual group members), having 
only a small overall impact on group efficacy. 
However, the loss of group trust can also result in the 
loss of a leader’s credibility within the group, which 
can further impact his/her leadership [c.f., 66]. The 
group’s perception of the leader’s credibility is a 
primary source of influence leveraged by the leader to 
manage the group and its members. George, Giordano 
et al. [25] pointed out that credibility 
assessments/perceptions can change over time. 
Individuals with higher perceived credibility are more 
likely to be trusted than those with lower credibility 
[c.f., 24]. In turn, loss of credibility within the group 
can trigger suspicion and motivate other members to 
detect deception. That is, those group members are apt 
to be more sensitive toward the leader’s behavior vis-à-
vis group interaction. Motivation as one of the 
antecedents can be essential in successful deception 
detection. The more motivated members are to 
identifying deception, the easier it is to find a 
communicator that is not creditable; however, the 
number of false alarms accompany the detection may 
also increase [24]. 
When the leader breaches a psychological contract 
by deceiving (or attempting to deceive) fellow 
members of a group, the dynamics of deception in 
group communication becomes more complex than 
deception in one-on-one interpersonal communication. 
The deceptive leader’s persuasive strategy must 
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account for multiple, interactive perspectives, which 
often requires a deceiver to leverage and combine 
cognitive and affective processes. That is, regardless of 
whether trust within a group is built on cognitive 
factors, affective factors or a combination, when trust 
is observed as being violated by a deceptive leader, 
subordinates’ perception and commitment to the 
organization may be negatively influenced [31]. 
Furthermore, the group’s collective view and 
assessment of the deceptive leader’s behavior will be 
impacted, and overall group trust may be undermined. 
This, in turn, results in less effective group 
interactions, and ultimately (negatively) affects the 
group’s overall performance. 
 
3. Close Relationships 
 
Close relationships and interaction within the group 
allows an opportunity for group members to construct 
baseline expectations and build trust with each other 
[43, 44, 62]. As group size and task characteristics 
would necessitate differences in ways people interact 
in groups, Hackman and Vidmar [32] empirically 
proved that optimal satisfaction is found with groups 
having four to five members (pp. 48-49). Wheelan [77] 
also confirmed that groups containing 3 to 6 members 
were significantly more productive and developmental 
than larger groups. The present study thus suggests 
designing experiments to facilitate small group 
situations where members are given opportunities to 
interact closely [41], which also follows the 
proposition postulated by Ho, Kaarst-Brown et al. [42] 
that “close relationships” are required to afford groups 
the opportunities to unknowingly observe subtle 
language-action cues that may indicate a lowering of 
trustworthiness (p. 276). 
Highly controlled and structured research design 
can allow researchers to collect a large dataset of 
parsed language-action cues as repeated measures, 
which represent the objective perspectives of virtual 
teams’ interaction. 
 
4. Language-Action Cues in Deception 
 
Ekman and Friesen [18] characterized deception as 
the purposeful concealment of the truth, either by 
omission or commission. Deception typically involves 
a persuasive, strategic process by which a deceiver 
transmits messages that have been deliberately 
distorted and/or manipulated, with the intention of 
misleading or misdirecting a receiver into reaching a 
wrong conclusion, or otherwise fostering a false belief, 
often for the deceiver’s own benefit [6]. Buller and 
Burgoon [6] proposed Interpersonal Deception Theory 
(IDT), which explores the chess-like “move/counter-
move” aspect of deception. Vrij [74] referred to 
deception as an intentional and volitional act. It would 
be an act of deception to convey a message knowing it 
to be false. However, it would not be an act of 
deception to convey a false message while believing it 
to be true [74, p. 5]. Gneezy [28] suggested that 
deception is often motivated by self-interest, and just 
as often results in an outcome that is detrimental to the 
other party(ies) involved. Deception occurs not only in 
face-to-face interactions, but also frequently occurs 
within computer-mediated communication (i.e., e-mail, 
instant-message, or group chat). 
 
4.1. Language-Action Cues 
 
Computer-mediated communication enables 
information to be transferred to a message receiver 
through words and a pattern of communication cues. 
These cues can reveal both the overt and covert intent 
of a message sender. However, in this cue-lean 
environment, the availability of such cues is effectively 
limited to the text itself without the physical cues in 
FtF communication. Nonetheless, even in ‘cue lean’ 
text-based communication, there can be linguistic and 
syntactical cues of deception. For example, Newman, 
Pennebaker et al. [58] suggested that the overuse of 
sensory or spatiotemporal words, and changes in the 
diversity and complexity of language have been shown 
to be suggestive of deception. Zhou, Burgoon et al. 
[80] noted that deceivers tend to be more casual and 
expressive in their linguistic style. Level of detail (too 
much or too little) may also be indicative of deception 
in both FtF and CMC communication. Deceivers in 
CMC particularly tend to be wordier than truth-tellers, 
but the additional words (i.e., detail) provided are not 
necessarily relevant or meaningful in context [82]. Not 
only so, Hancock, Curry et al. [33] discovered that 
deceivers tend to use more sense-based words (e.g., 
seeing, touching), few self-oriented but more other-
oriented pronouns in text-based CMC. Enabled with 
multiple cues and immediate feedbacks, richer media 
can increase the ability of message receivers to 
perceive and thus facilitate the deception detection 
[47]. However, simply knowing these linguistic cues 
does not help conversational partners to improve 
deception detection. Hancock, Birnholtz et al. [34] 
suggested that certain language-action cues (e.g., first-
person references, words of emotion or inhibition, etc.) 
have been shown to be effective indicators to 
differentiate deceivers from truth tellers. While, in 
general, humans are poor at detecting deception, Ho, 
Hancock et al. [39] computationally identified 
deceivers’ strategies through the use of salient 
language-action cues, which include the use of words 
associated with affective processes, cognitive 
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processes, self- and other- references, as well as the use 
of peripheral expressions and overall wordiness. 
The importance of immediacy cues and the 
representation of these cues illustrate psychological 
elements of communication [7-9]. A message sender 
may employ cues to associate (or distance) him/herself 
physically or psychologically from the content of a 
message [56, p. 203]. Buller and Burgoon [5] noted 
that deceivers often use both verbal and nonverbal 
means to “distance [him/herself] from others, to 
disaffiliate, and to close off scrutiny or probing 
communication” (p. 204). These include cues of (1) 
uncertainty and vagueness, (2) nonimmediacy, 
reticence, and withdrawal, (3) disassociation, and (4) 
image- and relationship-protecting behavior [5, p.204]. 
Similarly, social distance theorists [c.f., 13] suggested 
that a deceptive actor will try to minimize potential 
cues to minimize the cognitive load associated with 
deception, by adopting a cue-lean communication 
mode or style and thereby limiting opportunities for 
others to question or engage him/her in conversation. 
In FtF communication, a deceiver can create 
psychological distance by exhibiting literal (physical) 
distance (e.g., standing/ sitting remotely from the 
conversational party), or perhaps by choosing to 
interact via the telephone rather than meeting in 
physical space [56]. Likewise, in CMC 
communication, psychological distance can be created 
through word choice and phraseology—that is, 
minimizing immediacy [5]. Word choice and overall 
tone that suggest negative feelings (such as 
disappointment, frustration, or even anger) may be a 
sign of distancing, while word choice and tone 
suggesting a positive relationship—perhaps conveying 
humor or praise—can foster a positive, trusting 
relationship between communicating actors. 
 
4.2. Deceptive Leader’s Language-Action Cues 
 
Several studies have been conducted to illustrate 
how a deceptive insider’s behavior can be uncovered. 
Schultz [64], for example, speculated on a set of 
behavioral cues that can be used to predict deceptive 
insider attacks, including deliberate markers, 
meaningful errors, preparatory behavior, correlated use 
patterns, verbal behavior, and personality traits. 
Greitzer, Kangas et al. [29], [30] attempted to create a 
behavioral/ psychological model that can identify 
deceptive insiders with a view towards preemptive 
intervention. The focus in these models involves 
categorizing and modeling behaviors and 
psycholinguistic cues [3, 4, 68]. Brown, Watkins et al. 
[4] focused on linguistics—specifically, translating 
observed linguistic cues into behavioral categories 
identified as corresponding to behaviors significantly 
associated with deceptive insiders. Ho, Hancock et al. 
[40] further the investigation by setting up insider 
threat experiments with the complexity of objectives 
and tasks as controlled variables, and identifying that 
deceptive leaders can successfully conceal their 
deceptive intent in leader-member exchange. In other 
words, no statistical significant differences were found 
in deceptive leaders’ language-action cues after they 
were influenced to betray. No statistical significant 
differences were found in a deceptive leader’s 
language-action cues when compared with those of 
non-deceptive leaders. However, these findings only 
examine CMC deception from the perspective of the 
leaders’ communication. 
 
4.3. Language-Action Cues in Group Dynamics 
 
Taylor, Dando et al. [68] on the other hand 
examined the use of language-action cues (specifically, 
personal pronouns, as well as words conveying 
negative emotions and cognitive processes) in the 
context of deception through (asynchronous) e-mail 
exchanges, within and between teams in a common 
physical location. An insider threat experiment was 
conducted in which 25% of the participants were 
incentivized to “act” (i.e., pretend) to be deceptive 
insiders. Their study discovered that insiders who were 
told to pass information—without authorization—to a 
provocateur seemed to be more self-focused, and used 
more linguistic features associated with negative 
emotion and cognitive processes than non-deceptive 
insiders in the same group. Specifically, Taylor, Dando 
et al.’s [68] findings indicate that the deceptive insiders 
used more personal pronouns than others in their 
group. Additionally, Taylor, Dando et al. [68] found 
that the designated deceivers also used more words 
associated with cognitive processes (particularly 
discrepancy and tentative). 
 
5. Hypotheses Development 
 
Previous studies suggest that although no statistical 
significance was found when comparing a deceptive 
leader’s language-action cues with those of non-
deceptive leaders, and when comparing a deceptive 
leader’s language-action cues after they are 
incentivized to betray, it is possible to learn insights 
about the deceptive leaders from the interaction, as 
well as the reaction of the group members. That is, the 
language-action cues including wordiness and 
expressiveness (i.e., overall word count), as well as 
cognitive processes (i.e., words associated with insight, 
causation, discrepancy, certainty, inclusivity and 
exclusivity) and affective processes (i.e., words 
associated with positive and negative emotion) [60, 61] 
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can be indicative of deceptive insider’s intent from the 
perspective of the group dynamics. Building on these 
research insights, the current study hypothesizes on 
each of these cue-types, and presents three sets of 
hypotheses with respect to each. 
 
5.1. Expressiveness and Wordiness 
 
First, we consider overall word counts of the 
communication within groups that include a deceptive 
leader, and expect to observe the leader’s deception 
through wordiness and expressiveness that stimulates 
group communication. Ho, Hancock et al. [38], [40] 
suggested that group members will often sense this, 
resulting in more conversations as a whole. Thus, we 
attempt to aggregate and parse out word counts of all 
group members (including the deceptive leader), and 
we hypothesize that groups including deceptive leaders 
will likewise exhibit a higher overall word count than 
groups without a deceptive leader. That is, we would 
expect the overall word count of the groups that 
include deceptive leaders to be higher, because a 
deceptive leader stimulates more expression and words 
overall. Second, we would expect that the overall word 
counts of groups that include a deceptive leader will 
increase after the leader acts with deceptive intent. In 
this hypothesis, the deceptive leader is influenced to 
betray the organization for personal gain, rather than 
merely acting (i.e., pretending) to betray. Thus, the 
groups’ overall word counts are hypothesized to 
increase after the betrayal influence in a natural setting. 
Accordingly, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H1(a). Communication within groups that include a 
deceptive leader (treatment groups) will display 
more words overall than communication within 
groups consisting only of non-deceptive leaders 
(control groups) in a synchronous CMC group 
environment. 
 
H1(b). Groups that include a deceptive leader will 
display an increase of total word count after this 
leader has initiated a process of deception. 
 
5.2. Cognitive Process 
 
As the most prominent insider threat cases are often 
committed by those who are in power positions and 
betray inherent trust [37, 38], we note that certain 
influences can be found in the deceptive leader’s 
exchange with the subordinates, and further impact the 
subordinates commitment to the organization [31]. 
Griffith, Connelly et al. [31] validated the deceptive 
leader’s influences on leader-member exchange using 
survey instruments, while Ho, Hancock et al. [37, 38] 
simulated experiments to investigate the differences in 
language-action cues between deceptive leaders and 
non-deceptive leaders in group interaction, and 
specifically how language-action cues from groups that 
include a deceptive leader differed from those of 
groups that did not include a deceptive leader. 
Ho, Hancock et al.’s [37, 38] findings are 
consistent with Taylor, Dando et al.’s [68] findings, 
suggesting that, in both asynchronous and synchronous 
communication, deceptive leaders can be expected to 
use more words associated with cognitive processes in 
their communication than other members from the 
same group. In a different set of hypotheses, Ho, 
Hancock et al. [40] further identified differences in 
language-action cues—not only between deceptive 
leaders and non-deceptive leaders—but also between 
groups with a deceptive leader and groups without one. 
Ho, Hancock et al. [40] acknowledged that the cues to 
a leader’s deceptive behavior tend to be subtle, and 
may be hidden or even unnoticeable. The results also 
support the proposition that a statistically significant 
difference can be found in language-action cues 
between groups with a deceptive leader and groups 
without one. Our present study, thus, takes a further 
step to examine the group’s collective use of words 
associated with cognitive processes i.e., words 
connoting inclusion, exclusion, certainty and insight, 
and how these types of language-action cues are 
manifested in patterns of group communication. 
As a deceptive leader will influence the LMX [31], 
the study further posits that, as a result of a deceptive 
leader distancing him-/ herself from other team 
members, the group as a whole will sense a change—
specifically, a difference in the leader’s communication 
(e.g., use of more cue-lean communication modes, and 
distancing behaviors) [40]. As the deceptive leader 
attempts to disguise his/her deceptive intent, groups 
may collectively interact with the deceptive leader in 
ways that display less cognitive process (i.e., certainty, 
inclusion, suggestions, or insight). Accordingly, the 
following two hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H2(a). Communication within groups that include a 
deceptive leader (treatment groups) will display 
fewer words relating to cognitive process than 
communication within groups consisting of only 
non-deceptive leaders (control groups) in a 
synchronous CMC group environment. 
 
H2(b). Groups that include a deceptive leader will 
display an increase of cognitive process after this 
leader has initiated a process of deception. 
 
5.3. Affective Process 
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Moreover, as a deceptive leader will influence 
LMX [31], the study further proposes that a deceptive 
leader’s changed behavior can influence and infect an 
associated group with negative emotions. While the 
changed behavior of a deceptive leader may initially 
prompt analytical discussion amongst team members 
(i.e., the use of cognitive-process words reflecting 
uncertainty, discrepancy, insight, causation, question, 
etc.), the interaction within groups having a deceptive 
leader will quickly reflect affective processing (e.g., 
confusion, concern, emotion, frustration, or even 
apathy) [40]. Thus, the group’s collective use of words 
after deception has been initiated could have been 
more associated with affective processes, and the study 
suggests that groups including a deceptive leader are 
likely to show more emotion (i.e., affect) in their 
discussions, using more words reflecting affective 
processes (i.e., confusion, concern, frustration, or even 
apathy). Accordingly, the study proposes the following 
hypotheses on these cues in group dynamics: 
 
H3(a). Communication within groups that include a 
deceptive leader (treatment groups) will display 
more words of affect than communication within 
groups consisting only of non-deceptive leaders 
(control groups) in a synchronous CMC group 
environment. 
 
H3(b). Groups that include a deceptive leader will 
display an increase of affect after this leader has 
initiated a process of deception. 
 
6. Recommendations and Future Work 
 
This proposed framework can be empirically tested 
through simulating insider threat scenario-based 
experiments [42]. Data of group interaction can be 
collected to provide insight by comparing groups with 
vs. without incentives used to lure individuals to betray 
or to deceive the members of the same group. 
Experiments can also be set up to compare groups 
whose individuals are lured, but do not accept the 
incentive. 
Future analysis should focus on how group 
members collectively react and respond in situations 
where a leader becomes deceptive (i.e., “active” versus 
“passive” deception), not on the activities carried out 
during the deception. Future research may benefit from 
a revised design that manipulates this variable by 
offering different incentives for active versus passive 
deception. 
 
7. Conclusion and Contributions 
 
Insider threat detection and analysis involve 
multiple factors, and a better understanding of the 
leader’s trustworthiness dynamic in context. The 
framework illustrated in this paper supports the two 
propositions raised by Ho, Kaarst-Brown et al. [42] 
that group members work as smart sensors in close 
relationships to objectively reflect in their 
communication the subtle changes of the deceptive 
insider’s reduced trustworthiness (p. 276). This 
framework provides a base for insider threat detection 
through understanding of the group dynamics. 
Trust is essential for any group and organization to 
function. When a team leader violates trust, the 
leader’s deceptive behavior can influence the group’s 
communication and performance. Moreover, the 
collective language-action cues can be observed and 
collected as repeated measures during group 
interaction. To emphasize, the collective language-
action cues can be indicative when deception is 
present, and especially when the interaction within a 
team provides context for members to unknowingly 
become a network of sensors. Deceptive intent can be 
identified through the analysis of group interaction, 
and the analysis of a multilevel model can be an 
effective means in outing a deceptive leader. 
Organizations may consider the analysis of group 
interaction as one potential way to understand and 
identify leader deception. 
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